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Abstract: In the last years, artificial intelligence (AI) safety gained international recognition in
the light of heterogeneous safety-critical and ethical issues that risk overshadowing the broad
beneficial impacts of AI. In this context, the implementation of AI observatory endeavors represents
one key research direction. This paper motivates the need for an inherently transdisciplinary AI
observatory approach integrating diverse retrospective and counterfactual views. We delineate aims
and limitations while providing hands-on-advice utilizing concrete practical examples. Distinguishing
between unintentionally and intentionally triggered AI risks with diverse socio-psycho-technological
impacts, we exemplify a retrospective descriptive analysis followed by a retrospective counterfactual risk
analysis. Building on these AI observatory tools, we present near-term transdisciplinary guidelines
for AI safety. As further contribution, we discuss differentiated and tailored long-term directions
through the lens of two disparate modern AI safety paradigms. For simplicity, we refer to these
two different paradigms with the terms artificial stupidity (AS) and eternal creativity (EC) respectively.
While both AS and EC acknowledge the need for a hybrid cognitive-affective approach to AI safety
and overlap with regard to many short-term considerations, they differ fundamentally in the nature of
multiple envisaged long-term solution patterns. By compiling relevant underlying contradistinctions,
we aim to provide future-oriented incentives for constructive dialectics in practical and theoretical AI
safety research.
Keywords: AI safety; AI observatory; retrospective counterfactual risk analysis; artificial stupidity;
artificial creativity augmentation; cybersecurity; social psychology; HCI
1. Motivation
Lately, the importance of addressing artificial intelligence (AI) safety, AI ethics and
AI governance issues has been acknowledged at an international level across diverse AI
research subfields [1–6]. From the heterogeneous and steadily growing set of proposed
solutions and guidelines to tackle these challenges, one can extract an important recent
motif, namely the concept of an AI observatory for regulatory and feedback purposes.
Notable early practical realizations with diverse focuses include Italian [7], Czech [8],
German [9] and OECD -level [10] AI observatory endeavors. Thereby, the Italian AI
observatory project targets the public reception of AI technology and the Czech one tackles
legal, ethical and regulatory aspects within a participatory and collective framework.
The German AI observatory jointly covers technological foresight, administration-related
issues, sociotechnical elements and social debates at a supranational and international
level. Finally, the OECD AI Policy Observatory “aims to help policymakers implement the AI
Principles” [10] that have been pre-determined by the OECD and pertain among others to
data use and analytical tools. Theoretical and practical recommendations to integrate the
retrospective documentation of internationally occurring AI failures have been presented
by Yampolskiy [11] and very recently McGregor [12]. In addition, Aliman [13] proposed
to complement such reactive AI observatory documentation efforts with transdisciplinary
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and taxonomy-based tools as well as proactive security activities. In this paper, we build
on the approaches of both Yampolskiy and Aliman and elaborate on the necessity of a
transdisciplinary AI observatory integrating both reactive and proactive retrospective analyses.
As reactive analysis, we propose a taxonomy-based retrospective descriptive analysis (RDA)
which analytically documents factually already instantiated AI risks. As proactive analysis,
we propose a taxonomy-based so-called retrospective counterfactual risk analysis [14] (RCRA)
that inspects plausible peak downward counterfactuals [15] of those instantiated AI risks
to craft future policies. Downward counterfactuals pertain to worse risk instantiations
that could have plausibly happened in that specific context but did not. While an RDA
can represent a suitable tool for a qualitative overview of the current AI safety landscape
revealing multiple issues to be addressed in the immediate near-term, an RCRA can
supplement an RDA by adding breadth, depth and context-sensitivity to these insights
with the potential to improve the efficiency of future-oriented regulatory strategies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows—in the next Section 2, we first
introduce a simple fit-for-purpose AI risk taxonomy as basis for classification within RDAs
and RCRAs for AI observatory projects. In Section 3 and in the subsequent Section 4, we
elaborate on aims but also limitations of RDA and RCRA while collating concrete examples
from practice to clarify the proposed descriptive and counterfactual analyses. In Section 5,
we exemplify the requirement for transdisciplinarily conceived hybrid cognitive-affective AI
observatory approaches and more generally AI safety frameworks. In Section 5.1, we pro-
vide near-term guidelines directly linked to the practical factuals and counterfactuals from
RDA and RCRA respectively. Hereinafter, we discuss differentiated and bifurcated long-term
directions through the lens of two recent AI safety paradigms: artificial stupidity (AS) and
eternal creativity (EC)—succinct concepts which are introduced in Section 5.2. We provide
incentives for future constructive dialectics by delineating central distinctive themes in
AS and EC which (while overlapping with regard to multiple near-term views) exhibit
pertinent differences with respect to long-term AI safety strategies. Thereafter, in Section 6,
we briefly comment on data collection methods for RDAs and idea generation processes for
RCRAs. Finally, in Section 7, we summarize the introduced ensemble of transdisciplinary
and socio-psycho-technological recommendations combining retrospective analyses and
future-oriented contradistinctions.
2. Simple AI Risk Taxonomy
For simplicity and means of illustration, we utilize the streamlined AI risk taxonomy
displayed in Figure 1 for the classification of practical examples of AI risk instantiations
in the RDA and corresponding downward counterfactuals in the RCRA. This simplified
taxonomy has been derived from a recent work by Aliman et al. [16]. (Note that the original
taxonomy makes a substrate-independent difference between two disjunct sets of systems:
Type I systems and Type II systems. While the set of Type II systems includes all systems that
exhibit the ability to consciously create and understand explanatory knowledge, Type I systems
are by definition all those systems that do not exhibit this capability. Obviously, all present-
day AI systems are of Type I whereas Type II AI is up to now non-existent. In fact, the only
currently known sort of Type II systems are human entities. For this reason, the taxonomy
we consider here for RDA and RCRA only focuses on the practically-relevant and already
instantiated classes of Type I AI risks.) Following cybersecurity-oriented approaches to AI
safety [11,13,17,18], we do not only classically zoom in on unintentional failure modes but
also on intentional malice exhibited by malevolent actors. This distinction is reflected in the
utilized taxonomy by contrasting AI risks brought about by malicious human actors (risk
Ia and Ib) vs. those caused by unintentional failures and events (risks Ic and Id). Moreover,
the taxonomy distinguishes between AI risks forming themselves at the pre-deplyoment
stage (Ia and Ic) vs. those forming themselves at the post-deployment stage (Ib and Id).
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Figure 1. Simplified overview of main Type I artificial intelligence (AI) risks. Modified from Ref. [16].
3. Retrospective Descriptive Analysis (RDA)
3.1. Aims and Limitations
To allow for a human-centered AI governance, one requires a dynamic respon-
sive framework that is updatable by design [19] in the light of novel emerging socio-
technological [20–22] AI impacts. For this purpose, it has been postulated to combine
proactive and reactive mechanisms in AI governance frameworks in order to achieve an
effective socio-technological feedback-loop [19]. An RDA can be understood as a reactive
AI governance and AI safety mechanism. More precisely, taxonomy-based RDA docu-
mentation efforts could facilitate a detailed especially qualitative overview and valuable
opportunity for fine-grained monitoring of the AI safety landscape. It could be harnessed
to guide regulatory efforts, inform policymakers and raise sensitivity in AI security, law
and the general public. Further, an RDA could inform future ethical and security-aware AI
design and guide endeavors to build defense mechanisms for AI systems enhancing their
robustness and performance.
In addition to the proposed fourfold qualitative distinction via the classification in
risks Ia, Ib, Ic and Id, one could also introduce a quantitative parameter for intensity
ratings [23] such as harm intensity [13]. Given the harm-based nature of human cognitive
templates in morality [24,25], a harm parameter could provide a meaningful shortcut to
encode the urgency of addressing specific risk instantiations in practice. However, given
the simultaneous perceiver-dependency [25,26] of harm perception in morality which
is strongly based on dyadic considerations (the degree to which an intentional agent
is perceived to inflict damage to a vulnerable patient [25]), corresponding assignments
may not generalize. Nevertheless, identifying peaks of harm intensity above a certain
agreed upon threshold (e.g., starting at the level of lethal risks) from an RDA might
represent a responsible strategy with less controversial assignments. (Analogously, as
further specified in Section 4, it is meaningful to focus on analytically derived above
threshold downward counterfactuals as basis for an RCRA.) Extracted RDA peaks can be
useful to calibrate regulations where necessary while avoiding superfluous constraints for
multiple stakeholders that could hinder freedom and progress in the AI field.
Obviously, the quality of RDA results depends on data collection methods and an
RDA may not reveal a comprehensive overall picture. Generally, AI risk instantiations
could stay unreported, overlooked by the manual or automated data sampling or even
remain unnoticed in certain contexts despite already existing. Finally, it is important to
note that an RDA should not be understood as means to predict the future. As known
from Popper, a society cannot predict the contents of its own future knowledge [27].
This fundamental unpredictability is directly relevant to understand limitations of an AI
observatory—it can only reveal patterns of the past. There is no guarantee of repetitions
and for instance completely unknownable novel threats could emerge via future human
malevolent creativity in the form of risk instantiations Ia and Ib or via yet unknown errors
leading to future instances Ic and Id. Instead of conceiving of an RDA as an oracle, we
suggest framing it as a valuable preparative but incomplete tool with certain fundamental
and further non-fundamental limitations. How an RCRA can be utilized to tackle one
restriction of the latter sort is described in Section 4.
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3.2. RDA for AI Risk Instantiations Ia and Ib—Examples
To clarify the implementation of a taxonomy-based RDA for an AI observatory, we
briefly analytically document a variety of concrete already instantiated AI risks starting
with those linked to intentional malice (AI risks Ia and Ib). For risk Ia, the current goals
of the human entities in the context of many induced events are mostly either adversarial
goals hold by malicious actors or research goals of white hats and AI security researchers.
To provide a simple and compact overview for risk Ia, we group the space of these different
goals in a set of 6 (unquestionably non-exhaustive) main clusters: 5 adversarial clusters
and 1 research cluster conflating the research goals. The aim of the research cluster is to
demonstrate the feasibility of malicious AI design motivated by diverse adversarial goals
across a variety of domains in order to foster safety-awareness. Beyond that, we consider
1 extra emerging risk pattern, namely automated disconcertion [28] which we introduce in a
few paragraphs.
First, an adversarial cluster 1 could be described as grouping the use of generative AI
for subsequent (cyber-)crime facilitation for example, via impersonation [29–32]. Strik-
ing examples for adversarial cluster 1 include a deep-learning based voice cloning of the
CEO of a UK-based company that enabled a fraudster to acquire ca. $243,000 [32] and a
scammer that suceeded to cause a transfer of ca. $287,000 with a deepfake video sample
impersonation [30]. Second, one can indentify an adversarial cluster 2 related to defama-
tion, harassment, revenge and sextortion [33] typically employing deepfake techniques
such as deep learning based facial replacement to visually place targeted often female
individuals in pornographic video settings they never partook [34]. Third, adversarial
cluster 3 comprises the use of AI for misinformation and disinformation purposes [35]
including via fake profiles camouflaged with AI-generated synthetic portraits [36]. Fourth,
an adversarial cluster 4 consists in using deepfake methods (as well as recent applications of
deepfakes to virtual reality [37]) for a form of non-consensual voyeurism whereby even
underage victims are assumed to be affected in some cases [38]. Fifth, adversarial cluster 5
includes AI-supported espionage [39] (e.g., via AI-generated fake profile pictures on social
media platforms [40]), AI-aided intelligence gathering [41] and controversial AI-supported
targeted profiling [42].
Moreover, we identify a research cluster 1 as described. Notably, security researchers
provided proof-of-concepts among others related to designing camouflaged undetectable
fake samples usable for other crimes (e.g., adversarial deepfakes bypassing deepfake
filters [43] which could be misused to conceal unethical illegal material disguised as
deepfakes and furthermore undetected AI-generated fake comments i.a. on a federal public
comment website [44]). Recent security work also successfully explored advanced deepfake
techniques for improved impersonation, spear-phishing and large-scale disinformation [45].
Yampolskiy crafted a proof-of-concept for an AI-generated fake academic article [46]
perhaps simultaneously acting as cautionary example and as a form of honeypot [47] for
inattentive readers that might cite this article unknowingly. Other researchers identified an
emerging interest for deepfake ransomware [48] in certain cybercriminal circles. Beyond
that, it has been demonstrated that via a replica of a victim intelligent system (a deep
reinforcement learning agent), the policies of the victim system can be compromised in a
targeted way [49].
Interestingly, an already perceptible consequence of the mere existence of risk Ia instanti-
ations containing the design of deepfake technologies already led to the emergence of a risk
pattern which has been termed automated disconcertion [28]. Automated disconcertion
can imply the intentional or also unintentional mislabelling of real samples as fake—for
example, in the context of misleading conspiracy theories [50] or against the background of
uncertain political settings as it was the case in Gabon not long ago [51]. (To summarize
the latter, a “recent failed military coup in the context of pre-existing political unrest in Gabon
was partially grounded in the proliferation of the wrong assumption that an official presidential
video represented a manipulative deepfake video” [28]). Conversely, automated disconcertion
can also mean that fake samples are considered as being authentic or simply lead to highly
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uncertain and inconclusive settings in which doubts cannot be further resolved in reason-
able time with acceptable resources. In short, this additional outlier risk pattern is called
automated disconcertion since it does not further necessitate the interference of any actors
to be repeatedly instantiated after initiation.
Coming to risk Ib, its instantiations are currently predominantly concentrated in a
single research-oriented cluster (in analogy to research cluster 1 for risk Ia instantiations).
However, it is thinkable that exploits of AI vulnerabilities unknown to the public are
already taking place before disclosure (a type of zero-day exploits [52] applied to the
AI domain). The main benign research goal for security researchers to target risk Ib
instantiations is currently mostly to disclose existing AI vulnerabilities against malicious
attacks and explore possible novel defenses against those before their exploitation. This
already led to an incessant attacker-defender race in the fast moving field of security for
machine learning and adversarial examples [53–56]. In recent years, researchers have
among others developed different attack schemes on how to evade cybersecurity AI [57],
e-mail protection, verification tools [58], forensic classifiers [59] and person detectors [60],
how to elicit algorithmic biases [13,61], how to fool medical AI [62–65], law enforcement
tools [66] as well as autonomous vehicles [67,68], how to perform denial-of-service and
other adversarial attacks on commercial AI services [69–71], how to cause energy-intense
and unnecessarily prolonged processing time [72] and how to poison AI systems post-
deployment [73].
3.3. RDA for AI Risk Instantiations Ic and Id—Examples
In this subsection, we continue to elucidate the practical application of a taxonomy-
based RDA by now briefly analytically documenting various already instantiated uninten-
tionally triggered risks that formed themselves at the pre- and post-deployment stage (i.e.,
risk Ic and Id respectively). For risk Ic, we group the space of observed failure modes in
a set of 5 (unquestionably non-exhaustive) main failure clusters. In addition, we present
1 extra emerging risk pattern. In analogy to the outlier risk pattern of automated discon-
certion related to risk Ia instantiations, we introduce the risk pattern of automated peer
pressure representing an already perceptible side-effect of specific risk instantiations Ic. In
the case of AI risk instantiations Id, we consider a single main failure cluster. (Overall,
in some cases, it is difficult to delineate a risk instantiation type unambiguously (e.g.,
Ic vs. Id in the presence of multiple complex influences or even in a few cases Ic vs. Ia
given different ethical perspectives). This practical limitation is partially linked to the
perceiver-dependency of classification-related assignments that may also play a role in a
future AI observatory. However, by publicly sharing the sources, it is possible for entities
external to an AI observatory to refine interpretations. Generally, we humbly subscribe to
the epistemological view that all knowledge is fallible [74]).
For risk Ic, we consider the 5 main failure clusters described in the following. First,
failure cluster 1 comprises ethically-relevant instances of algorithmic bias [75]. Part of this
cluster are misclassifications of diverse underrepresented patterns in AI training datasets
with unethical repercussions as exhibited in for example, facial misidentification [76],
facial recognition failures [77,78], inaccuracy in AI-aided diagnosis [79]. Other cases are
datasets with historically outdated unethical labels [80] and ethically-sensitive training
biases favoring overrepresented patterns [81]. Second, failure cluster 2 refers to instances of
poorly designed low-performing AI that are halted subsequently [82]. Third, failure cluster
3 are AI methods designed for law enforcement but threatening privacy [83]. Fourth, failure
cluster 4 subsumes all unintentional risk instantiations linked to more or less hidden pseudo-
scientific or outdated and previously refuted preconceptions. For instance, the deployment
of AI for facial recognition of criminals based on “minute features” [84,85] in their face
is based on pseudo-scientific assumptions [86]. Further, the deployment of present-day
image-based “emotion recognition” AI is not grounded in state-of-the-art [87] affective
science and lacks the required multimodal and context-sensitive modelling to be able to
mimick how humans infer [88] (and not detect) affective patterns. In fact, a ban has been
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requested for premature emotion AI i.a. to prevent usage in ethically sensitive settings [89]
such as law enforcement, fraud detection or recruiting. Fifth, failure cluster 5 is linked to
affective, persuasive [90] and (micro-)targeted AI-aided methods that already permeate
human cognitive-affective constructions in a way extending beyond the initial design purposes
and causing epistemic biases ranging from a loss of critical stance via AI-empowered social
media [91,92] to flawed mind perception in present-day robots [93,94].
A further risk pattern that emerged via the mere existence of specific AI risk instantia-
tions Ic assignable to the failure cluster 5, is a construct that we call automated peer pressure.
It is already known that attention at a collective level can be intentionally biased and ma-
nipulated in social media [91] also with the help of bots [95,96] (risk Ia). Moreover, as
stated in an open letter written by multiple known psychologists and sent to the American
Psychological Association: “[...] the desire for social acceptance and the fear of social rejection are
exploited by psychologists and other behavior change experts to pull users into social media sites and
keep them there for long periods of time” [97]—especially children [90]. Susceptible collective
attention mechanisms and beliefs are already even unintentionally [92] strongly influenced
by AI-empowered social media initially developed for benign purposes. Paired with the
strong social dependency of humans where social pressure plays an important regulatory
role with biological roots [98], it already triggered what one could call automated peer
pressure, a self-perpetuating pattern of social pressure [99–103] without the need for social
agents that directly and consciously exert it. Beyond that, the known group phenomenon
of “self-reinforcing networks of like-minded users” [96] encountered in social media has been
termed homophily [91,96]. Overall, a combination of a multiplicity of heterogeneous factors
of which epistemic biases, homophily, affective contagion [91,104], bots and automated
peer pressure are only a subset may foster the documented spread of propaganda in so-
cial media [96] as well as the reported negative impacts on the mental health of young
users [92,105].
Finally, concerning AI risk Id, we observe one main failure cluster which is connected
to unanticipated post-deployment usage modes and contexts which also includes eventual
complications within unusual interactions of the AI system in a dynamically changing
environment. Notable examples are failures of facial recognition AI linked to COVID-19
causing the widespread use of facial masks [106–108], the invariant responses of natural
language processing systems when faced with nonsensical instead of usual meaningful
queries [109] (disclosing the low level of understanding) and the AI-based censorship of a
picture displaying ancient slavery settings due to a forerunning misclassification labelling
the sample as displaying nudity [110]. Other cases include unknown latent biases in
medical AI [111] and other forms of biases in medical AI that unfold post-deployment as a
function of geographical factors [112].
4. Retrospective Counterfactual Risk Analysis (RCRA)
4.1. Aims and Limitations
While upward counterfactuals of a factual event refer to the better ways in which that
event could have unfolded but did not, downward counterfactuals refer to those conceivable
ways in which this event could have turned out worse. In the past, counterfactual thinking
has often been framed as detrimental rumination or even as cognitive bias. However, a mod-
ern explanatory framework from social psychology termed functional theory of counterfactual
thinking (abbreviated with FTCT in the following) stresses that counterfactual thoughts
can offer “[...] insights that comprise blueprints for future action [...]” [15]. FTCT stresses that
counterfactual thinking serves problem-solving and can exhibit high usefulness especially
in complex multi-causal domains [15]. At the intrapersonal level, counterfactual thoughts are
based on implicit processes caused by problems, they are linked to a negatively valenced
state of core affect [113] and have the potential to evoke (mental or physical) actions that
can potentially correct the underlying errors. This procedure instantiates a regulatory loop—
which corresponds to a type of negative feedback model [113] enacted as goal-oriented
corrective behavior.
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Recently, the notion of an RCRA [14] building upon downward counterfactuals from
historical events has been proposed to risk stakeholders in the context of risk management
applied to hazardous events (such as earthquakes or terroristic attacks). As explained by
Woo [14], such an innovative augmented historical analysis represents a generic universal
tool that can supplement regulatory resilience tests and sense-making while facilitating the
formation of more differentiated and nuanced views. Given its conjectured domain-general
nature and seeming applicability to complex multi-causal domains of risk analysis, we
suggest to transfer RCRA to AI observatory contexts at a conceptual level.
For illustration purposes, the Section 4.3 presents a simplified RDA-based RCRA
which directly builds upon the exemplary RDA performed in the last Section 3. Our
method is loosely inspired by Woo’s RCRA conception which manifests itself by the general
integration of downward counterfactuals from historical samples. However, our step-wise
methodology (elucidated in the subsequent Section 4.2) to extract meaningful candidates
for the simulation1 of downward counterfactuals given a large state space of past events
has been independently conceived and tailored to the specific AI observatory domain.
Overall, we understand an RCRA as complement for a forerunning RDA. Together, this
pair of retrospective analyses could provide a solid starting point for future AI observatory
projects to be however necessarily updated and error-corrected with time.
In abstract terms, combining RDA and RCRA can be seen as a socio-technological en-
actment of the regulatory loop-governing behavior [113] described in FTCT—which fits to
the AI governance recommendation mentioned earlier in Section 3.1, namely the notion of
a socio-technological feedback-loop combining proactive and reactive measures [13,19,20].
While an RDA mainly represents a reactive documenting approach, an RCRA attempts to
broaden future proactive measures by anticipating potential extreme branches of the future
while resisting the fallacy to cast itself as oracle tool. We emphasize that in the light of the
fundamental unpredictability of future knowledge creation as well as the fallibility and
incompleteness of human knowledge, surprises and errors are unavoidable. No RCRA can
guarantee unassailability. This is similarly the case in cybersecurity for other types of tech-
niques that are likewise assignable to a broad class of proactive security measures related
to downward counterfactuals such as penetration testing [114] and red teaming [115,116].
Also there it holds that the non-detection of a vulnerability does not guarantee its absence.
(Conversely, the detection of a vulnerability does also not guarantee its future exploitation
by malicious actors2).
4.2. Preparatory Procedure
After having expounded on aims and limitations of an RDA-based RCRA, we speak
to the preparatory procedure of meaningfully extracting the required downward coun-
terfactuals for an RCRA taking as input the set ORDA containing all instances from the
forerunning RDA. However, before providing further details, we recall as mentioned in
Section 3.1 that a meaningful agreed upon threshold τ of harm intensity is recommendable.
Although perceiver-dependent, a sufficiently high threshold such as for example, when set
to plausible downward counterfactuals of at least lethal dimension may be suitable. On an
oversimplified harm intensity scale with 1 standing for almost no harm and 5 for existential
risk, let 4 stand for a lethal risk (with 2 encoding minor and 3 major harm). Naturally,
this threshold and scale are solely employed for purely illustrative purposes and more
differentiated and tailored approaches may be required in practice [13]. Equipped with
the scale and the exemplary threshold τ = 4, we elaborate in the following on how the
set ORCRA of all clusters3 considered in an RCRA can be constructed starting with ORDA
1 Downward counterfactuals can be (co-)created for example, in a predominantly mental form, facilitated by immersive design fiction settings [28]
(including storytelling narratives and virtual reality) or simulated and visualized with technological tools.
2 For instance, their interest could shift, the asset could be(come) less interesting or the attack too time-consuming and costly.
3 For an enhanced context-sensitivity and to avoid overfitting to the idiosyncrasies of single isolated events, we recommend RCRA simulations at the
level of clusters and not of single instances as becomes apparent in the next Section 4.3.
Philosophies 2021, 6, 6 8 of 34
and consecutively applying the following ordered sequence of 4 operations in yet to be
described ways: (1) taxonomization, (2) analytical clustering, (3) brute-force deliberation and
threshold-based pruning, (4) assembly.
As first step, taxonomization is applied to ORDA which consists in a one-to-one mapping
of each AI risk instantiation sample to either a key from the taxonomy (i.e., Ia, Ib, Ic or Id) or
in theory to a generic placeholder key for novel unknown patterns. In our description, all
samples were directly or at least secondarily assignable to the pre-existing taxonomy keys
and no unknown key was required. As second step, the researchers apply an analytical
clustering operation based on a self-generated explanatory semantic grouping linking
every sample associated with a specific key, to a cluster. By way of example, under
risk Ia discussed in Section 3.2, this operation led to 5 adversarial clusters, 1 research
cluster and 1 extra cluster. In a third step, the researchers apply brute-force deliberation4
and threshold-based pruning by mentally going through every single sample of ORDA and
trying to devise—within reasonable self-determined time limits—a plausible downward
counterfactual where it holds for the self-rated harm intensity h, that h ≥ τ. If such a
suitable downward counterfactual is generated in time, the sample is maintained, otherwise
the sample is discarded from further consideration. Finally, the fourth operation assembly
is performed which requires to assemble ORCRA by linking back the remaining samples
to their clusters from the second step. On this basis, one obtains the generic downward
counterfactuals that need to be analyzed for the intended RCRA. In short, this simple step-
wise procedure takes RDA instances as inputs and produces a set of generic RCRA clusters
as output. This output set ORCRA represents the superset of the searched meaningful
generic above threshold downward counterfactuals of interest. For clarification, the next
paragraph briefly comments on the application of this simple preparatory procedure to our
exemplary RDA instances.
While applying the third step of brute-force deliberation and threshold-based pruning,
we deleted a large amount of RDA samples since many instances did not seem to have
had a plausibe downward counterfactual with a harm intensity h ≥ τ. However, we
decisively already identified certain rare samples where this condition was fulfilled. In
the fourth step, we assembled ORCRA by linking these maintained samples back to 8 RDA
clusters as described in the following. For risk Ia, we deleted the first and fifth adversarial
cluster but maintained adversarial cluster 2 (encoded with Aa2), adversarial cluster 3 (Aa3),
adversarial cluster 4 (Aa4), the single research cluster (Ra1) and the extra cluster (Ea1) of
automated disconcertion. For risk Ib, the standalone research cluster (Rb1) was maintained.
For risk Ic, only the extra cluster (Ec1 ) of automated peer pressure remained, and we deleted all
failure clusters. Finally, for risk Id, we kept the single available failure cluster (Fd1). While
these clusters were mapped to factual risk instantiations, an RCRA obviously requires the
generation of corresponding downward counterfactuals. Thus, instead of Aa2 , we encode
its unreal generic downward counterfactual which we denote A′a2 . Similarly, instead
of Aa3 , we write A
′
a3 and so forth. Consequently, as illustrated in a highly simplified
form in Figure 2, one can hereafter fairly straightforwardly assemble these fragments
















4 In theory, this search can be optimized further. However, the aim is to (at a later stage) obtain a broad as possible set of counterfactual instances to
increase illustrative power. Both one-to-one and many-to-one mappings between downward counterfactual instances and clusters can potentially
become RCRA-relevant if stored. This is connected to the complementary cognitive co-creation method used to interlink the preparatory procedure
with the RCRA that we explain in Section 6.2.
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Figure 2. Simplified sketch on possible preparatory procedure to extract peak generic downward
counterfactuals for a retrospective counterfactual risk analysis (RCRA) out of a forerunning taxonomy-
based retrospective descriptive analysis (RDA) for an AI observatory. The top node stands for the
initial set ORDA containing all RDA samples. For illustration, the risk instantiation clusters from
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 are filled in. A refers to adversarial, R to research, E to extra and F to failure cluster.
The conjunction of all analytically derived leaves are possible generic above threshold downward
counterfactuals of interest for the RCRA. In this example, the output set for the RCRA corresponds to














d1}. For more details, see text.
4.3. Exemplary RDA-Based RCRA for AI Observatory Projects
Recently, co-creation design fictions (DFs) [117,118] known from human-computer inter-
action (HCI) [119] have been recommended for security practices in the AI field [120] and
at the intersection between AI and virtual reality (AIVR) [28]. Generally, DFs “can be used
for technological future projections by experts in the form of for example, narratives or construed
prototypes that can be represented in text, audio or video formats but also in VR environments” [28]
(whereby the authors cautioned likewise not to regard a DF as a means to predict the future
but as preparatory tool). In our view, one promising way to perform an RDA-based RCRA
could be to frame each RCRA cluster as co-creation DF task. Distinctively, instead of pro-
jecting into the future as performed in classical DF contexts, such an RDA-based RCRA-DF
construes instances of RCRA cluster narratives (or experiential prototypes) projecting to the
counterfactual past. For illustration, we apply a simplified RDA-based RCRA-DF to each















in the preparatory procedure of the previous Section 4.2. For RCRA-DFs pertaining to
intentional malice (risks Ia and Ib), we provide short DF narratives taking the form of a
succinct threat model [28,121] specifying adversarial goals, knowledge and capabilities. By
contrast, for unintentional failure modes (risks Ic and Id), we instead describe a short failure
model comprising initial design goals, knowledge gaps and unintended effects. Gener-
ally, we only consider instantiations of RCRA clusters that correspond to above threshold
downward counterfactuals (i.e., with a harm intensity h ≥ τ whereby in Section 4.2, τ was
exemplarily set to lethal risk dimensions).
4.3.1. Downward Counterfactual DF Narrative A′a2
• Adversarial Goals: AI-aided defamation, revenge, harassment and sextortion.
• Adversarial Knowledge: Since it is a malicious stakeholder that is designing the AI,
the system is available to this adversary in a transparent white-box setting. Concerning
the knowledge pertaining to the human target, a grey-box setting is assumed. Open-
source intelligence gathering and social engineering are exemplary tools that the
adversary can employ to widen its knowledge of beliefs, preferences and personal
traits exhibited by the victim.
• Adversarial Capabilities: In the following, we briefly speak to exemplary plausible
counterfactuals of at least lethal nature that malicious actors could have been capable
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to bring about and that are “worse than what actually happened” [14] (as per RDA). For
defamation purposes, it would have been for instance possible to craft AI-generated
fake samples that wrongly incriminate victims with not actually executed actions (e.g.,
a fake homicide but also fake police violence) leading to a subsequent assassination
when deployed in precarious milieus with high criminality. To enact revenge with
lethal consequences in socio-cultural settings that particularly penalize the violation
of restrictive moral principles, similar AI-based methods could have been applica-
ble (e.g., via deepfakes assumingly displaying fake adultery or contents linked to
homosexuality). An already instantiated form of AI-enabled harassment mentioned
in the RDA consists in sharing fake AI-generated video samples of pornographic
nature via social media channels [34]. Consequences could include suicide of vul-
nerable targets (as generally in cybervictimization [122]) or exposure to a lynch mob.
In fact, the contemplation of suicide by deepfake pornography targets has already
been reported lately [33]. Finally, concerning AI-supported sextortion, warnings di-
rected to teenagers and pertaining to the convergence of deepfakes and sextortion
have been formulated recently [123]. Given the link between sextortion and suicide
associated with motifs such as i.a. hopelessness, humiliation and shame [124], con-
sequences of technically feasible but not yet instantiated deepfake sextortion scams
could also include suicide—next to simplifying this criminal enactment by adding
automatable elements.
4.3.2. Downward Counterfactual DF Narrative A′a3
• Adversarial Goals: AI-aided misinformation and disinformation.
• Adversarial Knowledge: Identical to adversarial knowledge indicated in Section 4.3.1.
• Adversarial Capabilities: Technically speaking, a malicious actor could have crafted
misleading and disconcerting fake AI-generated material that could be interpreted
by extreme endorsers of pre-existing misguided conspiracy theories as providing
evidence for their beliefs inciting them to subsequent lethal violence. A historical
precedent of gun violence as reaction to fake news seemingly confirming false con-
spiracy theories was the Pizzagate shooting case where a young man fired a rifle in a
pizzeria “[...] wrongly believing he was saving children trapped in a sex-slave ring” [125].
Beyond that, when it comes to (micro-)targeted [91] disinformation, conceivable mali-
cious actors could have more systematically already employed hazardous AI-aided
information warfare [96] techniques in social media. This could have been supported
by AI-enabled psychographic targeting tools [91] and via networks of automated
bots [96,126] partially concealed via AI-generated artefacts such as fake profile pic-
tures. While the level of sophistication of many present-day social bots is limited [127],
more sophisticated bots emulating a breadth of human online behavior patterns are
already developed [128,129] and it is known for some time [130] that “[...] political bots
exacerbate political polarization” [131]. By AI-aided microtargeting of specific groups
of people that are ready to carry out violent acts, malicious actors could have caused
more political unrest with major lethal outcomes. In fact, Tim Kendall who was a
prior director of monetization at Facebook recently stated more broadly that “[...] one
possible near-term effect of online platforms’ manipulative and polarizing nature could be civil
war” [92].
4.3.3. Downward Counterfactual DF Narrative A′a4
• Adversarial Goals: AI-aided non-consensual voyeurism.
• Adversarial Knowledge: Identical to adversarial knowledge indicated in Section 4.3.1.
• Adversarial Capabilities: Before delving into downward counterfactuals that corre-
sponding malicious actors could have already brought about, it is important to note
that the goal considered in this cluster is not primarily the credibility or appearance
of authenticity exhibited by the synthetic AI-generated contents. Rather, the focus
when visually displaying the target non-consensually in compromising settings is
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more on feeding personal fantasies or facilitating a demonstration of power [37,38]
while the synthetic samples can obviously concurrently be shared via social media
channels. Against this backdrop, it is not difficult to imagine that when editing visual
material of vulnerable targets with practices such as deep-learning based “undress-
ing” [38], a disclosure could induce motifs of hopelessness, humiliation and shame
in some of those individuals provoking suicidal attempts similar to the hypothetical
deepfake sextortion counterfactual described in Section 4.3.1. The mere sensing of
having been victimized via non-consensual deepfake pornography has also been
associated with the perception of a “digital rape” [33,132]. Especially when the vic-
tims are underage [38], this could plausibly reinforce suicidal ideation. Another
dangerous avenue may be subtle combination possibilities available to the malicious
actor. Non-consensual voyeuristic (but also more generally abusive) illegal but quasi-
untraceable material bypassing content filters could be meticulously concealed with
deepfake technologies and unnoticedly propagated5 for some time. This could hinder
criminal prosecution and particularly threaten the life of vulnerable young victims.
Potentiated with automated disconcertion, it could cause a set of latent lethal socio-
psycho-technological risks.
4.3.4. Downward Counterfactual DF Narrative R′a1
• Adversarial Goals: Research on malevolent AI.
• Adversarial Knowledge: Identical to adversarial knowledge indicated in Section 4.3.1.
• Adversarial Capabilities: To begin with, note that in this RCRA cluster, we assume
that the research is motivated by malign intentions contrary to the corresponding fac-
tual RDA research cluster that is conducted with benign and precautionary intentions
by security researchers and white hats as mentioned in Section 3.2. This additional
distinction is permissible due to its property as downward counterfactual. By way of
illustration, malicious actors could have already performed research on malevolent AI
design in the domain of autonomous mobility or in the military domain. They could
have developed a novel type of meta-level physical adversarial attacks on intelligent
systems6 directly utilizing other physically deployed intelligent systems under their
control. Such an attacker-controlled intelligent system could be employed as a new
advanced form of present-day physical adversarial examples [60,69,134–137] against
a selected victim intelligent system. The maliciously crafted AI could have been
designed to optimize on physically fooling the victim AI system once deployed in
the environment for example, via physical manipulations at the sensor level such as
to misleadingly bring about victim policies with lethal consequences entirely unin-
tended by the operators of the victim model. A further concerning instance of malign
research could have been secretive or closed-source research on automated medical
AI forgery tools that add imperceptible adversarial perturbations to inputs such as
to cause tailored customizable misclassifications. While the vulnerability of medical
AI to adversarial attacks is already known [62–65,138] and could be exploited by
actors intending medical fraud for example, for financial gains, certain exertions of
this practice in the wrong settings could be misused as tool for murder attempts and
targeted homicides.
5 For instance by mixing real material with synthetic elements obtained from style-based generative adversarial network methods [133], deep-learning
based face-replacement and adversarial deepfake techniques [43] in order to evade content filters critical to law enforcement.
6 With intelligent systems, we refer to technically feasible AIs able to independently perform the OODA-loop (i.e., observe, orient, decide, act),
but simultaneously totally subordinated to and goal-governed by human entities (e.g., using updatable human-defined ethical goal functions [19]
prepared pre-deployment—where humans fill in ethically-relevant parameters into a suitable blank but context-sensitive scientifically-grounded
template denoted augmented utilitarianism [13]).
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4.3.5. Downward Counterfactual DF Narrative E′a1
• Adversarial Goals: This extra cluster of automated disconcertion refers to a risk
pattern that emerged automatically from the mere availability and proliferation of
deepfake methods in recent years. However, it is conceivable that this AI-related
agentless automatic pattern can be intentionally instrumentalized in the service of
other (not necessarily AI-related) primary adversarial goals. One example for a
primary adversarial goal cluster in the light of which it is appealing for a malicious
actor to strategically harness automated disconcertion, would be information warfare
and agitation on social media. In fact, early cases may already occur [50].
• Adversarial Knowledge: Identical to adversarial knowledge indicated in Section 4.3.1.
• Adversarial Capabilities: The use of social media in information warfare has been
described to be linked to the objective to intentionally blur the lines between fact and
fiction [91]. The motif of automated disconcertion itself could be weaponized and
misleadingly framed as providing evidence for post-truth narratives offering an ideal
breeding ground for global political adversaries performing information warfare via
disinformation. Malicious actors could then intensify this framing with the use of
pertinent AI technology enlarging their adversarial capabilities as described earlier
under the cluster of AI-aided misinformation and disinformation in Section 4.3.2.
Given that automated disconcertion may aggravate pre-existing global strategically
maintained confusions [139], it becomes clear that a more effective incitement to lethal
violence, political unrest with major lethal outcomes or civil wars could be achieved.
4.3.6. Downward Counterfactual DF Narrative R′b1
• Adversarial Goals: Research on vulnerabilities of deployed AI systems.
• Adversarial Knowledge: Grey-box setting (partial knowledge of AI implementation
details).
• Adversarial Capabilities: As analogously described in Section 4.3.4, we assume that
the research is conducted with malicious intentions. Zero-day exploits of vulnera-
bilities in (semi-)autonomous mobility and cooperative driving settings to trigger
extensive fatal road accidents seem realizable.
4.3.7. Downward Counterfactual DF Narrative E′c1
• Designer Goals: Although automated peer pressure refers to an agentless self-
perpetuating mechanism that emerged through AI-empowered (micro-)targeting7
on social media, its origins can certainly be traced back to the original benign or
neutral economic intentions underlying the early design of social media platforms.
Psychologist Richard Freed called present-day social media an “attention economy” [90]
and it is plausible that social media profits from the maximization of utilization time
spent by their users.
• Knowledge Gaps: Early social media designers may not have foreseen the far-reaching
consequences of the designed socio-technological artefacts including threats of lethal
dimension or even existential caliber according to some present-day viewpoints [92].
• Unintended Failures: The more attention users pay to social media contents, the
more time they may spend with like-minded individuals (consistent with
7 As for instance successfully performed in the Cambridge Analytica case [91].
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homophily8 [91,96]) and the more they may be prone to automated peer pressure. The
latter can an also be partially fueled by social bots aggravating polarization [131]. The
bigger the success of information warfare and targeted disinformation on social media
and the higher the performance of the AI technology empowering it, the more groups
of like-minded peers could (but of course not necessarily) uptake misleading ideas.
Individuals could then—via these repercussions—sense a social pressure to suppress their
critical thinking and get accustomed to simply copy in-group narratives irrespective of
their contents. This scenario could in turn play into the hands of malicious actors of
the type mentioned in Section 4.3.5 and raise the amount and intensity of the lethal
and catastrophic scenarios of the sort described in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.8. Downward Counterfactual DF Narrative F′d1
• Designer Goals: Implementation of high-performance AI.
• Knowledge Gaps: Designers cannot predict the emergence of yet unknown global
risks for which no scientific explanatory framework exists (otherwise that would
contradict the fundamental unpredictability of future knowledge creation mentioned
in Section 4.1). Given that the past does not contain data patterns of yet never instan-
tiated hazards, the datasets utilized to train “high-performance” AI cannot already
have these eventualities reflected in their metrics.
• Unintended Failures: Exemplary failures that resulted from this unavoidable type of
knowledge gap, are multiple post-COVID AI performance issues [138,153,154]. Simul-
taneously, humanity relies more and more on medical AI systems. Would humans
have been confronted with a more aggressive type of yet unknown biological hazard
requiring even faster reactivity, it is conceivable that under the wrong constellations,
the AI systems optimizing on metrics pertaining to the then deprecated old or on the
novel but yet too scarce and thus biased datasets [154] could have led to unreliable
policies up to the potential of a major risk.
5. Discussion
5.1. Hybrid Cognitive-Affective AI Observatory—Transdisciplinary Integration and Guidelines
In this Section 5.1, we compile near-term AI safety guidelines with respect to: (1) the
factual RDA clusters introduced in Section 3 and (2) the RDA-based RCRA clusters from
Section 4.3. For (2), we only specify the necessary supplementary and non-overlapping
guidelines to avoid repetitions.
5.1.1. Near-Term Guidelines for Risks Ia and Ib
RDA
• Aa1 : Clearly, for risk Ia instances of adversarial cluster 1 related to the misuse of gener-
ative AI to facilitate cybercrimes (e.g., via impersonation within social engineering
phone calls), already known security measures regarding identity check are needed
as minimum requirement. A standard approach to mitigate dangers of malevolent
impersonation [155] is to go beyond something you are (biometric) [156], and to also
require something you know (password) [157] and/or something you have (ID card).
Generally, an awareness-raising training of users and employees on social engineer-
ing methods including the novel combination possibilities emerging from malicious
8 Homophily in social media is a multidimensional construct that can refer to attitudes, beliefs, preferences, appearances across a variety of domains.
It is by no means limited to the often discussed case of political homophily [140]. For example, empirical social media studies identified weight-
based homophily [141], journalistic homophily [142], homophily in rumor sharing [143], higher perceived homophily by users from collectivistic
cultures [144], perceived homophily driving consumer purchase intentions [145] and credibility of information [146], homophilic effects in consumer-
website relationships [147], homophily as factor for vlogger popularity [148], ideological hashtag homophily in marketing campaigns [149] and
even homophily related to music preferences [150]. Apart from that, it is known in social psychology that “ingroups are seen as more variable than
outgroups” [151] (especially in individualistic cultures). This could arguably strengthen the (wrong) perception of engaging in heterogeneous online
spaces. However, some studies actually found social media patterns diverging from homophily [152]. Hence, it is important to further assess the
context-sensitive nature of the phenomenon in future work.
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generative AI design seems indispensable. In addition, it may be helpful to sys-
tematically complement those measures with old-fashioned but potentially effective
pre-approved but updatable private arrangements made offline which can also employ
offline elements for identity check. For instance, the malicious actor may not be able to
react appropriately in real-time if presented with a from his perspective semantically
unintelligible inspection question making use of offline pre-agreed upon (dynamically
updated) linguistically ciphered insider idioms. The induced confusion could con-
sequently help to dismantle the AI-aided impersonation attempt. Having said this,
it is important to analyze the attack surface that the availability of voice cloning and
even video impersonation with generative AI brings about when instrumentalized for
attacks against widespread voice-based or video-based authentication methods.
• Aa2 : This cluster pertaining to AI-aided defamation, harassment, revenge and sex-
tortion exhibits the need for far-reaching legislatures for the protection of potential
victims. Legal frameworks but also social media platforms may need to counteract
large-scale propagation of material that threatens the safety of targeted entities. Social
services could initiate emergency call hotlines for dangerous deepfake victimization.
Moreover, the creation of (virtual or physical) local temporary shelters or havens for
affected individuals combining a team of transdisciplinary experts and volunteers for
acute phases immediately succeeding the release of compromising material on social
media channels appears recommendable. However, the initiation of a societal-level
debate and education could foster destigmatization of deepfake instrumentalized
for defamation, harassment and revenge. It could dampen the effects of widely
distributed compromising material once the general public looses interest in such
currently salient elements. More broadly, educating the public about the capabilities
of deep-fake technology could be helpful in mitigating defamation, harassment and
sextortion since just like society learned to deal with fake Photoshop images, society
can also learn scepticism towards AI-generated content.
• Aa3 : AI-aided misinformation and disinformation represents a highly complex socio-
psycho-technological threat landscape that needs to be addressed at multiple levels
using multi-layered [158] approaches. For instance, in a recent work addressing the
malicious applications of generative AI and corresponding defenses, Boneh et al. [128]
provide a list of directly or indirectly concerned actors: “authors of fake content; authors
of applications used to create fake content; owners of platforms that host fake content software;
educators who train engineers in sensitive technologies; manufacturers and authors who create
platforms and applications for capturing content (e.g., cameras); owners of data repositories
used to train generators; unwitting persons depicted in fake content such as images or deepfakes;
platforms that host and/or distribute fake content; audiences who encounter fake content;
journalists who report on fake content; and so on”. Crucially, as further specified by
the authors, “a precise threat model capturing the goal and capabilities of actors relevant
to the system being analyzed is the first step towards principled defenses” [128]. In fact,
as briefly adumbrated in Section 4.3, the format of the RDA-based RCRA-DFs we
proposed for risk Ia and Ib was purposefully instantiating exactly that—a threat model.
Overall, we thus recommend grounding the development of near-term AI safety
defenses (as applied to AI-aided disinformation but also more generally) in RDA-
based RCRA-DFs that can be once generated potentially retroactively diversified by
novel DF narrative instances tailored to the exemplary actors mentioned by Boneh
and collaborators. This could broaden the RCRA results and allow for an enhanced
targeted development of countermeasures.
• Aa4 : For this AI-aided form of non-consensual voyeurism, the measures of an emer-
gency hotline and a specialized haven as mentioned under cluster Aa2 are likewise
applicable. Legislators need to be informed on psychological consequences especially
for underage victims. While cluster Aa2 implied the overt public dissemination of
compromising material by what minor individuals would be less at risk given the
potential repercussions, the purely voyeuristic case can often be covert and attracts
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motivational profiles that can target minor individuals [38]. In addition, it might be
valuable to proactively inform the general public and also adult population groups
susceptible to this issue in order to lift the underlying taboos and to mitigate negative
psychological impacts. In the long run, instantiations of this cluster are unlikely to
be prevented any more than one can prevent someone fantasizing about someone
else. Hence, in the age of fake generative AI artefacts with the virtualization of fake
acts of heterogeneous nature normally violating physical integrity in the real-world, it
might become fundamentally important to re-assess and/or update societal notions
intimately linked to virtual, physical and hybrid body perception in a critical and
open dialogue.
• Aa5 : With regard to AI-aided espionage, companies and public organizations in
sensitive domains need to broadly create awareness especially related to the risk of
fake accounts with fake but real appearing profile pictures. For instance, since the
generator in a generative adversarial network (GAN) [159] is by design imitating
features from a given distribution, advanced results of a successful procedure could
appear ordinary and more typical—potentially facilitating a psychologically-relevant
intrinsic camouflaging effect. In effect, according to a recent study focused on the
human perception of GAN pictures displaying faces of fake individuals that do not
exist, “[...] GAN faces were more likely to be perceived as real than Real faces”9 [160]. Beyond
that, the authors described an increased social conformity towards faces perceived
as real independently of their actual realness. This is concerning also in the light of
the extra cluster Ec1 of automated peer pressure that could make AI-aided espionage
easier. A generic trivial but often underestimated guideline that may also apply
to AI-aided open-source intelligence gathering would be to reduce the sharing of
valuable information assets via social media channels and more generally on publically
available sources to a minimum. Finally, to confuse person-tracking algorithms
and prevent AI-aided surveillance misused for espionage, camouflage [161] and
adversarial patches [60] embedded in clothes and accessoires can be utilized.
• Ra1 : As deep-fake technology proliferates and is used in numerous criminal domains,
it is conceivable that an arms-race between malevolent fakers and AI forensic ex-
perts [162,163] will ensue, with no permanent winner. Given that this cluster Ra1
covers a wide variety of research domains in which security researchers and white
hats attempt to preemptively emulate malicious AI design activities to foster safety
awareness, a consequential recommendation appears to actively support such research
at multiple scales of governance. Talent in this adversarial field would need to be
attracted by tailored incentives and should not be limited to a standard sampling from
average sought-after skill profiles in companies, universities and public organizations
of high social reputation. This may also help to avoid an undesirable drift to adver-
saries for instance at the level of information operations risking reinforcing capacities
mentioned in the downward counterfactual DF narratives on cluster A′a3 , R
′
a1 and
E′a1 presented in Section 4.3. Hence, a monolithic approach in AI governance with a
narrow focus on ethics and unintentional ethical failures is insufficient [13]. Finally,
we briefly address guidelines related to a specific Ra1 issue concerning science (as asset
of invaluable importance for a democratic society [164]) that did not yet gain attention
in AI safety and AI governance but that makes further inspections appear imperative
in the near-term. Namely, targeted studies on AI-aided deception in science to produce
AI-generated text disseminated as fake research articles (see the research prototype
developed by Yampolskiy [46] in another research context) and possibly AI-generated
audiovisual or other material meant to display fake experiments or also fake historical
samples (see the recent MIT deepfake demonstration [165] developed for educative
9 Note that on the long-term this could in theory skew the unconscious internal model internet users exposed to more and more synthetic faces have
of how human faces look like. Outliers from the real distribution could be met with more surprise at the subpersonal level. However, the latter
might already be the case today with the widespread use of enhancing filters on social-media.
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purposes). However, this technical research direction requires a supplementation by
transdisciplinary experts addressing the socio-psycho-technological impacts and par-
ticularly the epistemic impacts of corresponding future risk instantiations. We suggest
that for a safety-relevant sense-making, AI governance may even need to stimulate
debates and exchanges on the very epistemological grounding of science—before for
example, future texts written by maliciously designed sophisticated AI bots (also
called sophisbots [128]) infiltrate the scientific enterprise with submissions that go un-
detected. For instance, there is a fundamental discrepancy10 between how Bayesian and
empiricist epistemology would analyze this risk vs. how Popperian critical rationalist
epistemology would view the same risk. Disentangling this epistemic issue is of high
importance for AI safety and beyond as becomes apparent in the guidelines linked to
the next cluster Ea1 below.
• Ea1 : Near-term guidelines to directly tackle this extra cluster associated to automated
disconcertion seem daunting to formulate. However, as a first small step, one could
focus on how to avoid exacerbating it. One reason why this cluster may seem difficult
to address is due to its deep and far-reaching epistemic implications pertaining to
the nature of falsification, verification, fakery and (hyper-)reality [169] itself. With
regard to this feature of epistemic relevance, Ea1 exhibits a commonality with the just
introduced different risk of AI-aided deception in science. We postulate that in the
light of pre-existing fragile circumstances in the scientific enterprise including the
emergence of modern “fake science” [170] patterns but also the mentioned fundamen-
tal discrepancies across epistemically-relevant scientific stances, AI-aided deception in
science could have direct repercussions on automated disconcertion. First, it could for
instance unnecessarily aggravate automated disconcertion phenomena in the general
public as for example, the belief in epistemic threats [166] could increase people’s sub-
jective uncertainty. Second, a reinforced automated disconcertion can subsequently
be weaponized and instrumentalized by malicious actors with lethal consequences as
generally depicted under the downward counterfactual DF narrative E′a1 described in
Section 4.3. This explains our near-term AI governance recommendation to address
AI-aided deception in science as transdisciplinary collaborative endeavor analyzing
socio-psycho-technological and epistemic impacts.
• Rb1 : For this cluster linked to risk Ib and pertaining to research on AI vulnerabilities
currently performed by security researchers and white hats, we recommend (as analo-
gously already explained in Ra1 ) to recruit such researchers preemptively. In this vein,
Aliman [13] proposes to “organize a digital security playground where “AI white hats” en-
gage in adversarial attacks against AI architectures and share their findings in an open-source
manner”. For the specific domain of intelligent systems, it is advisable to proactively
equip these AIs with technical self-assessment and self-management capabilities11 [20]
allowing for better real-time adaptability for the eventuality of attack scenarios known
from past incidents or proof-of-concept use cases studied by security researchers and
white hats. However, it is important to keep in mind that challenges from this cluster
also deal with zero-day AI exploits, they are the unknown unknowns and cannot be
meaningfully anticipated and prevented, though it is realized that many issues could
be caused by under-specification in machine learning systems [171].
10 Bayesian and empiricist epistemological stances placing the empirical collection of evidence and the identification of true beliefs at the center of science
may link AI-aided deception to “epistemic threats” [166]—knowledge-relevant impairments of belief-updating which they already see emerging
via deepfakes (i.a. subsuming a general decrease of information in audiovisual samples [166]). By contrast, Popperian epistemic views [167] and
especially their Deutschian extension [168] predominantly emphasize in the first place the explanatory and criticism-centered purpose of science next
to the (experimental) falsifiability of hypotheses. Strikingly, Deutsch describes science as the endless quest for invariant, hard-to-vary explanations of
reality [168]. On this view, AI-aided deception in science may be practically problematic, but without question solvable. In fact, while the empiricist
direction faces epistemic threats and a post-truth difficulty, the Popperian and Deutschian direction may neither see explanatory knowledge, truth,
falsifiability nor the scientific method per se at risk.
11 The conjunction of technical self-assessment and self-management has been summarized under the synonymous umbrella terms of Type I AI
self-awareness [13], self-awareness functionality [20] or simply self-awareness.
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RCRA (Additional Non-Overlapping Guidelines)
• A′a2 : Generally, one possible way to systematically reflect upon defense methods
for specific RCRA instances (generated from downward counterfactual clusters) of
harm intensity hdown ≥ τ, could be to perform corresponding upward counterfactual
deliberations targeting a harm intensity hup < τ. As briefly introduced in Section 4.1,
upward counterfactuals refer to those ways in which a certain event could have
turned out better but did not. Recently, Oughton et al. [172] applied a combination
of downward and upward counterfactual stochastic risk analyis to a cyber-physical
attack on electricity infrastructure. In short, the difference to the method that we
propose is that instead of focusing on slightly better upward counterfactuals given the
factual event as made sense in the case of Oughton et al., we suggest a threshold-
based selection of below threshold upward counterfactuals given above threshold downward
counterfactuals12. For instance, as applied to the present downward counterfactual
cluster A′a2 which also included a narrative instance describing suicide attempts with
lethal outcomes as a consequence of AI-aided defamation, harassment and revenge, it
could simply consist in deliberations on how to avoid these lethal scenarios. This could be
implemented by deliberating from the perspective of planning a human, hybrid or
fully automated AI-based emergency team response with a highly restricted timeframe
(e.g., to counteract the domino-effect initiated by the deployment of the deepfake
sample on social media). Next to a proactive combination of deepfake detectors and
content detectors for blocking purposes that can fail, a reactive automated social
network graph analysis AI combined with sentiment analysis tools could be trained
to detect large harassment and defamation patterns that if paired with the sharing of
audiovisual samples, can prompt a human operator. This individual could then decide
to call in social services that in turn proactively contact the target offering support as
analogously mentioned under the guidelines for the factual RDA sample Aa2 .
• A′a3 : For this downward counterfactual cluster on AI-aided misinformation and
disinformation of at least lethal dimensions, we focus on recommendations pertain-
ing to journalism-relevant defenses and bots on social media. Disinformation from
fake sources could be counteracted with the use of blockchain-based reputation sys-
tems [173] to assess the quality of information sources. Journalists could also entertain
a collective blockchain-based repository containing all news-relevant audiovisual
deepfake samples whose authenticity has been refuted so far. This tool could be
utilized as publically available high-level filter to evade certain techniques of disin-
formation campaigns. Moreover, the case of hazardous large-scale disinformation
supported by sophisticated automated social bots is of high relevance for what one
can term social media AI safety. Ideally, tests for a “bot shield” enabling some bot-free
social media spaces could be crafted. However, it is conceivable that at a certain point,
AI-based bot detection [174] might become futile. Also, social bots already fool peo-
ple [131,175] and many assume that humans will become unable to discern them in the
long-term. Nevertheless, it could be worthwhile viewing what one could have done
better already with present technological tools (the upward counterfactuals)—which
can also include the consideration of divergent unconventional solutions or novel
formulations of questions. As stated by Barrett, “[...] progress in science is often not an-
swering old questions but asking better ones” [176]. Perhaps, in the future, humans could
still devise bot shielding tactics that could attempt to bypass epistemic issues [177]
intrinsic to imitation game and Turing Test [178] derivatives where “real” and “fake”
become relative.
• A′a4 : To tackle suicidal ideation as a consequence of AI-aided non-consensual voyeurism
that enters the awareness of the targeted individual, one may need to extend the coun-
termeasures already mentioned in the factual RDA counterpart Aa4 of this cluster
12 Since as mentioned earlier, lower harm intensity may lead to more perceiver-dependent differences, one does not exactly need to establish which
exact intensity, one only needs to know that it is a non-lethal upward counterfactual scenario.
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(which also included the creation of public awareness and the removal of associated
taboos). Social services and public institutions like universities and schools could offer
emergency psychological interventions for the person at risk. Next to necessitated
measures at the level of legal frameworks to protect underage victims, the subtle
case of adult targets calls for instance for a civil reporting office collaborating with
social media platforms which could initiate a critical dialogue with the other party
to bring about an immediate deletion or at least categorical refraining from further
dissemination of the material which can be calibrated to the expectations of the target.
Recently, the malicious design of deepfakes has been described as a “[...] serious
threat to psychological security” [179]. Adult targets may despite the synthetic nature
of the deepfake samples and often eventually their private character restricted to a
personal possession of the agent in question, perceive their mere existence as degra-
dation [180]—a phenomenon certainly requiring social discourses in the long-term.
For a principled analytical approach, an extensive psychological research program
integrating a collaboration with i.a. AI security researchers could be helpful in order
to be able to contextualize relevant socio-psycho-technological aspects against the
background of advanced technical feasibility. Importantly, instead of limiting this
research to deepfake artefacts in the AI field, one needs to also cover novel hybrid
combination possibilities available for the design of non-consensual voyeuristic mate-
rial. Notably, this includes blended applications at the intersection of AI and virtual
reality [28,37] (or augmented reality [181]).
• R′a1 : Concerning proactive measures against future research where an adversary
designs self-owned intelligent systems to trigger lethal accidents on victim intelli-
gent systems, one might require legal norms setting minimum requirements on the
techniques employed for the cybernetic control of systems deployed in public space.
From an adversarial AI perspective, this could include the obligation to integrate
regular updates on AI-related security patches developed in collaboration with AI
security researchers and white hats that also study advanced physical adversarial
attacks. This becomes particularly important as many stakeholders are currently
unprepared in this regard [182]. As guideline, we propose that future adversarial AI
research endeavors explore attack scenarios where adversarial examples on physically
deployed intelligent systems are delivered by another physically deployed intelligent
system which potentially offers more degrees of freedom to the malicious actor. From
a systems engineering perspective, any intelligent system might need to at least in-
tegrate multiple types of sensors and check for inconsistencies at the symbolic level.
Next to explainability requirements, a further valuable feature to create accountabil-
ity in the case of accidents could be a type of self-auditing via self-assessment and
self-management [20] allowing for a retrospective counterfactual analysis on what
went wrong.
• E′a1 : As its factual counterpart Ea1 , this counterfactual cluster E
′
a1 refering to automated
disconcertion instrumentalized for AI-aided information warfare and agitation on
social media with the risk to incite lethal violence at large scales, represents a weighty
challenge of international extent. As for Ea1 , multi-level piecemeal tactics of construc-
tive small steps such as for example, targeted methods to avoid exacerbating it may
be valuable. Concerning AI governance, that could include the strategies mentioned
under Ea1 but also more general efforts in line with international frameworks that aim
to foster strong institutions and error-correction via life-long learning (see e.g., [19]
for an in-depth discussion).
• R′b1 : For this counterfactual cluster pertaining to malicious research on vulnerabilities
of deployed AI systems with the goal to trigger extensive fatal road accidents, we
recommend tailored measures analogous to those presented for the counterfactual
cluster R′a1 .
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5.1.2. Near-Term Guidelines for Risks Ic and Id
As can already be realized from the scope of the AI safety guidelines proposed in
Section 5.1.1 which are grounded in our AI observatory exemplification of RDA and
RCRA, modern AI technology cannot be analyzed in isolation. In our view, due to the
complex multi-causal socio-psycho-technological interwovenness underlying AI risks and
their instantiations, AI safety requires an inherently transdisciplinary, hybrid and cognitive-
affective approach [13]. Transdisciplinarity is especially required to avoid cognitive blind
spots within AI safety risk analyses and formulations of countermeasures or guidelines.
AI safety needs a hybrid perspective to incorporate the intricacies of human-computer
interactions necessitating a consideration of human nature next to purely technological
viewpoints. Finally, a cognitive-affective perspective is called for due to the inseparably
affective nature of human cognition [183,184] whose disregard in AI development can
consequently engender significant safety issues by virtue of a lack of requisite variety [185].
While the last Section 5.1.1 focused on guidelines concerning the AI risks Ia and Ib related
to intentional malice, this Section 5.1.2 is linked to the risks Ic and Id related to mistakes
and unintentional failures which are often of ethically-relevant nature. This specific avenue
of research represents a well-studied field at the core of modern AI ethics which recognizes
multidisciplinarity, human-centeredness and socio-technical contextualization as important
requirements [186]. In the last years, a large multiplicity of heterogeneous AI ethics
guidelines have been proposed at an international level [187–190]. We refer the reader to
Jobin et al. [191] for a global overview of internationally proposed AI ethics guidelines
which are directly of relevance for the 5 failure clusters (Fc1 to Fc5 ) linked to risk Ic from the
RDA presented in Section 3.3. In the following, we focus on the few remaining RDA and
RCRA clusters which are not classically in the primary focus of AI ethics.
RDA
• Ec1 : This cluster related to automated peer pressure can be i.a. met by measures raising
public awareness on the dangers of the confirmation bias [192,193] reinforced via AI-
empowered social media. However, a possible upward counterfactual on that issue
would be to revert negative consequences of automated peer pressure by utilizing it
for beneficial purposes. For instance, it is cogitable that automated peer pressure need
not represent a threat would it simply perhaps paradoxically socially reinforce critical
thinking instead of reinforcing tendencies to blindly copy in-group narratives. Ideally,
such a peer pressure would reinforce heterophily (the antonym of homophily) with
regard to various preferences with one notable exception being the critical thinking
mode itself. Hence, one interesting future-oriented solution for AI governance may
be education and life-long learning [19] conveying critical thinking and criticism as
invaluable tools for youth and general public. For instance, critical thinking skills
fostered in the Finnish public education system were effective against disinformation
operations [91]. In fact, critical thinking, criticism and transformative contrariness may
not only represent a strong shield to tackle disinformation or automated disconcertion
and its risk potentials (cluster Ea1 and E
′
a1 respectively), but it also represents a crucial
momentum for human creativity [13,194]. Generally, peer pressure is in itself a
psychological tool that could be systematically used for good, for example by creating
an artificial crowd [195] of peers with all members interested in desirable behaviors
such as education, start-ups or effective altruism. A benevolent crowd of peers can
then counteract hazardous bubbles on social media.
• Fd1 : Concerning AI failures rooted in unanticipated and yet unknown post-deployment
scenarios, it becomes clear that accuracy and other AI performance measures cannot
be understood as conclusive and engraved in stone. A possible proactive measure
against post-deployment instantiations of yet unknown AI risks could be the estab-
lishment of a generic corrective mechanism. Problems which AI systems experience
during its deployment due to differences between training and usage environments
can be reduced via increased testing and continued updating and learning stages.
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On the whole, multiphase deployment, similar to vaccine approval phases, can re-
duce an overall negative impact on society and increase reliability. Finally, for each
safety-critical domain in which AI predictions are involved in the decision-making
procedure, one could—irrespective of present-day AI performance—foresee the proac-
tive planification of a human response team in case of sudden expanding anomalies
that a sensitized and safety-aware human operator could detect.
RCRA (Additional Non-Overlapping Guidelines)
• E′c1 : A twofold guideline for this counterfactual cluster (refering to automated peer
pressure with lethal consequences via automated disconcertion instrumentalized for
AI-aided disinformation), could be to weaken the influence of social bots by measures
described under cluster A′a3 and by transforming automated peer pressure into strong
incentives for critical thinking as stated in Ec1 .
• F′d1 : Finally, for this cluster of major risk dimension being the counterfactual coun-
terpart of cluster Fd1 , we emphasize the importance of an early proactive response
team formation in contexts such as for instance medical AI, AI in the financial market,
AI-aided cybersecurity and critical intelligent cyberphysical assets. In short, AI sys-
tems should by no means be understood to be able to truly operate independently in
a given task even if current excellent performance measures seem to suggest so. In the
face of unknown and unknowable changes, performance is a moving target which if
mistaken as conclusive and static could endanger human lifes.
5.2. Long-Term Directions and Future-Oriented Contradistinctions
After having introduced a broad variety of near-term guidelines for future AI observa-
tory endeavors based on the exemplified systematic factual and counterfactual retrospective
analyses, we provide a differentiated more general outlook on explicitly long-term AI safety
directions. For this purpose, we select two recent theoretical AI safety paradigms: on the
one hand a direction that has been termed artificial stupidity (AS) (see [196–198]) and on the
other hand, a direction that we succinctly call eternal creativity (EC) stemming from recent
work [13,16,199]. Thereby, note that these two paradigms are by no means postulated to
represent the full panoply of nuances and views across the entirety of the young AI safety
field. Rather, we select these specific two examples because critical contradistinctions
ascertainable via a comparative analysis point to a set of decisive bifurcations which might
be of particular interest for the AI safety community due to their potentially axiomatic
relevance for the future of AI research. While AS and EC coincide in multiple short-term
considerations given their common hybrid cognitive-affective nature and their emphasis on
cybersecurity-oriented practices, they fundamentally differ with regard to 3 future-relevant
contradistinctions.
We consider the following 3 contradistinctive leitmotifs: (1) regulatory distinction
criterium, (2) regulatory enactment and (3) substrate management. First, while AS primar-
ily considers intelligence levels for (1), EC ponders the ability to consciously create and
understand explanatory knowledge. Second, whilst AS foresees deliberate restrictions of
AI capabilities as tool for (2), EC especially tackles their systematic enhancement. Third,
while AS views substrate-dependent hardware analyses (next to software considerations) for
bounded equalization between humans and AIs as approach to (3), EC aims at unbounded
substrate-independent functional augmentation. While there exist certainly more possible
lines along which one could compare AS and EC, we focus on the mentioned 3 themes
due to their urgency and potential to foster constructive dialectics in future theoretical and
applied AI (safety) research beyond AI observatory contexts. In Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, we
briefly provide a general introduction followed by a summarization of long-term AI safety
guidelines formulated from the perspective of AS and EC respectively as seen through the
lens of these 3 contradistinctions.
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5.2.1. Paradigm Artificial Stupidity (AS)
One core assumption in the AS paradigm is that an artificial general intelligence
(AGI) “[...] can be made safer by limiting its computing power and memory, or by introducing
Artificial Stupidity on certain tasks” [197]. Thereby, an AI system is understood to be made
artificially stupid on a certain task if its capabilities are deliberately limited by human
designers for the purpose of matching the human performance on that task. One mentioned
exemplary domain where such a technique is already applied is in text-to-speech synthesis
such as e.g in Google Duplex, an AI for natural conversations over the phone whose
implementation included “[...] the incorporation of speech disfluencies (e.g., “hmm”s and
“uh”s)” [200]. Another example is the context of video games where AI can in principle
vastly exceed human performance which is however purposefully restricted in order to
allow for a positive human-centered gaming experience. More generally, there are many
AI application domains where it is human-desirable to mimic anthropic performance
or behavioral patterns for an improved customer service. These cases correspond to a
type of imitation game which only succeeds if the AI does not reveal latent super-human
capabilities. From that point of view, the AS paradigm conceives of making an AI artificially
stupid as being necessary to making it pass a Turing test [197,198].
Simultaneously, in the last years, AI achieved superhuman-level performance across
more and more tasks. Further, it is assumed in AS that “[...] AI tends to quickly achieve super-
human level of performance after having achieved human-level performance” [198]. Against this
background, AS argues distinguishingly that “[...] by limiting an AI’s ability to achieve a task,
to better match humans’ ability, an AI can be made safer, in the sense that its capabilities will not
exceed humans’ capabilities by several orders of magnitude” [198]. In short, AS postulates that
AI ability needs to be upper-bounded by human performance since it risks to otherwise become
uncontrollable13 once it turns into what Bostrom termed a superintelligence—an intellect
exceeding human cognitive performance across “[...] virtually all domains of interest” [203].
Such a hypothetical future artificial superintelligence is believed to not necessarily be
value-aligned with humans (while potentially becoming unintelligible to humans due to
the gaps in performance), to be capable of insidious betrayal (a scenario termed treacherous
turn [203]) and to potentially represent a major risk [204] to humanity.
• Regulatory distinction criterium: In this light, one can extract intelligence (or more
broadly “performance” or “cogntive performance” across tasks) as the recurring theme
of relevance for regulatory AI safety considerations under the AS paradigm. At a first
level, one could identify two main safety-relevant clusters: a cluster comprising all
AIs that are less or equally capable than an average human [198] and another cluster
of superintelligent AI systems. The latter can be further subdivided into three classes
of systems as introduced by Bostrom [203]: (1) speed superintelligence, (2) collective
superintelligence and (3) quality superintelligence. According to Bostrom, the first
ones “can do all that a human intellect can do, but much faster”, the second ones are
“composed of a large number of smaller intellects such that the system’s overall performance
across many very general domains vastly outstrips that of any current cognitive system” and
the third ones are “at least as fast as a human mind and vastly qualitatively smarter” [203].
• Regulatory enactment: In a nutshell, AS recommends limiting an AI in hardware and
software such that it does not attain any of these enumerated sorts of superintelligence
since “[...] humans could lose control over the AI” [197]. AS foresees regulatory strategies
on “how to constrain an AGI to be less capable than an average person, or equally capable,
while still exhibiting general intelligence” [198].
• Substrate management: To limit AI abilities while maintaining functionality, AS pro-
poses multiple practical measures at the hardware and software level. Concerning the
former it proposes diverse restrictions especially pertaining to memory, processing,
clock speed and computing [198]. With regard to software, it foresees necessary limits
13 For an in-depth discussion related to AI uncontrollability and unpredictability, see especially [201] and [202] respectively.
Philosophies 2021, 6, 6 22 of 34
on self-improvement as well as measures to avoid treacherous turn scenarios [197].
Another guideline consists in deliberately incorporating known human cognitive
biases in the AI system. More precisely, AS postulates that human biases “can limit the
AGI’s intelligence and make the AGI fundamentally safer by avoiding behaviors that might
harm humans” [197]. Overall, the substrate management in AS can be categorized as
substrate-dependent because the artificial substrate is among others specifically tuned to
match hardware properties of the human substrate for at most equalization purposes.
In summary, AS suscribes to the viewpoint that AI safety aims to “limit aspects of
memory, processing, and speed in ways that align with human capabilities and/or prioritize
human welfare, cooperative behavior, and service to humans” [196] given that AGI “[...]
presents a risk to humanity” [196].
5.2.2. Paradigm Eternal Creativity (EC)
According to Deutsch, “the only uniquely significant thing about humans [...] is our ability
to create new explanations [...]” [168]. He further specifies that explanatory knowledge “gives
people a power to transform nature which is ultimately not limited by parochial factors, as all other
adaptations are, but only by universal laws” [168]. Instead of emphasizing levels of intelligence
or of performance across a wide set of tasks when analyzing AI safety issues, EC focuses
epistemologically on one unique “task”: the ability to consciously create and understand
explanatory knowledge. Thereby, in EC, explanatory knowledge creation also implies the
capability to consciously understand. Given that core affect is understood as a fundamental
property of consciousness [176,183] and is linked to cognitive-affective counterfactual delib-
erations [16], this excludes philosophical zombie themes [205]. (In modern embodied and
enactive cognition frameworks [176,206], consciousness is linked to processes of inference
for the cybernetic control of a substrate in an environment connected to allostasis [184]
(anticipation of needs before they occur [176])—integrating predictions and error signals
from external and internal milieu. It is on such cybernetic control grounds that affective
dynamics give rise to the egocentric virtual first-person perspective of the world [207,208]
familiar to humans and lacking in present-day AI).
Note that EC’s focus on consciously creating and understanding explanatory knowl-
edge is by no means an anthropomorphic assumption forced on AI systems. As elucidated
in constructor theory [209,210], a novel explanatory framework in physics, explanatory
knowledge creators (of which currently only humans are known) are brought to the fore in
physics in an entirely non-anthropocentric way. To put it very simply, constructor theory
focuses on possible vs. impossible counterfactuals that is, what could happen given physical
laws and why (instead of predictions based on laws of motion and initial conditions). On
contemplating the set of all physical transformations that would be possible in the uni-
verse that is, those that could happen, one would notice that the size of the very subset
containing those transformations that actually happen can be strongly influenced by entities
able to create and understand knowledge on how to bring them about [168]. This is how
explanatory knowledge creation enters “the cosmic scheme of things” [168] and this is also
why EC prioritizes the conscious understanding and creation of explanatory knowledge
via creativity14 instead of intelligence.
At first sight, given the fundamental unpredictability of future explanatory knowledge,
it might seem dangerous for AI safety. Deutsch mentions that “no good explanation can
predict the outcome, or the probability of an outcome, of a phenomenon whose course is going to be
significantly affected by the creation of new knowledge” [168] and further that this fundamental
limitation is something that “when planning for the future, it is vital to come to terms with
14 From a psychological and neurocognitive perspective, EC currently views creativity as a tri-partite evolutionary affective construct with varying
degrees of sightedness [199] instead of a blind evolutionary process without a goal akin to biological evolution—as mistakenly assumed by
Popper [16,211]. This is epistemologically relevant because ideas are not created by blind trial and error (as variation and selection in biological
evolution). Even if novel idea contents are fundamentally unpredictable a priori, idea variation is partially guided by previous experience, the
task and contextual cues that is, there is a non-zero coupling between variation and selection [211]. Creativity itself could have historical roots in
serendipity and multi-purpose socially shared doubt [13] facilitating in theory error-correction but initially largely used to maintain traditions.
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it” [168]. EC agrees. EC recently formulated the AI safety paradox [13,16] stating that value
alignment and control are conjugate requirements in AI safety. This means that both
prevailing ideals cannot be simultaneously fulfilled. EC also states that “the price of security
is eternal creativity” [13]. So despite the AI safety paradox, a cybersecurity-oriented and
risk-centered AI safety is possible—when reframed “as a discipline which proactively addresses
AI risks and reactively responds to occurring instantiations of AI risks” [13]. In short, AI safety is
not condemned, it just needs to come to terms with the compulsion to keep correcting and
creating solutions “ad infinitum”.
• Regulatory distinction criterium: EC distinguishes two substrate-independent and
disjunct sets of systems: Type I and Type II systems. Type II systems are all systems
for which it is possible to consciously create and understand explanatory knowledge.
Type I systems are all systems for which this is an impossible task 15. Thereby, a subset
of Type I systems can be conscious (such as non-human mammals) and requires
protection akin to animal rights. Obviously, all present-day AI systems are of Type I and
non-conscious. Type II AI is non-existent today.
• Regulatory enactment: In theory, with a Type II AI, “a mutual value alignment might be
achievable via a co- construction of novel values, however, at the cost of its predictability” [13].
As with all Type II systems (including humans), the future contents of the knowledge
they will create are fundamentally unpredictable—irrespective of any intelligence
class16. In EC, this signifies that: (1) Type II AI is uncontrollable17 and requires rights on a
par with humans, (2) Type II AI could engage in a mutual bi-directional value alignment with
humans—if it decides so and (3) it would be unethical to enslave Type II AI. (Finally, banning
Type II AI is a potential loss of requisite variety and does not hinder malicious actors
to do so.) By contrast, regarding Type I AI, EC implies that: (4) Type I AI is controllable,
(5) Type I AI cannot be fully value-aligned across all domains of interest for humans due
to an insufficient understanding of human morality, (6) conscious Type I AI is possible
and would require animal-like rights but it is clearly non-existent nowadays.
• Substrate management: To avoid functional biases [214] due to a lack of diversity in
information processing, EC opts for a substrate-independent functional view. Irrespec-
tive of its specific substrate composition, an overall panoply of systems is viewed
as one unit with diverse functions. Given Type-II-system-defined cognitive-affective
goal settings, a systematic function integration can yield complementary synergies.
Notably, EC recommends research on substrate-independent functional artificial cre-
ativity augmentation [199] (artificially augmenting human creativity and augmenting
artificial creativity). For instance, active inference could technically increase Type I
AI exploratory abilities [215,216]. Besides that, in Section 6.2, we apply a functional
viewpoint to augment RCRA DF generation by human Type II systems for AI observa-
tory purposes.
15 EC could be stated to apply a constructor-theoretic distinction to AI safety insofar as it applies a possibility-impossibility dichotomy [209] embedded
in an explanatory framework to it.
16 Under EC, superintelligence is as explained not of distinctive interest. It is also viewed as not implying profound qualitative differences to human
baselines. Following Deutsch, it would be “[...] subject only to limitations of speed or memory capacity, both of which can be equalized by technology” [212].
EC views human augmentation as valid transformative defense strategy [199].
17 Importantly, note that Type II AI uncontrollability does by no means imply that a Type II AI is necessarily more dangerous than an arbitrarily
designed Type I AI. First, it is important to consider that already an advanced Type I AI could lead to existential risks for instance when maliciously
designed by malevolent human actors to operate “at a global scale (e.g., affecting global ecological aspects or the financial system)” [16]. Second, while it is
obvious that a Type II AI could be highly dangerous, this also holds for humans including adult terrorists threatening international safety. Overall,
it seems a prejudice to assume that Type II AIs that would be members of an open society would inherently tend to opt for immutable goals of
indifference or extreme violence (see e.g., Hall [213] for an in-depth explanation). Those patterns are possible choices posing major risks, but not
inherent properties of Type II systems—the content of whose future novel ideas and related decisions cannot be prophesied a priori. In short, there is
no meaningful total order of “dangerousness” according to which one can compare Type I and Type II AIs. To put it plainly: both the worst risk and
the greatest luck for a Type II system could be a Type II system.
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6. Materials and Methods
6.1. RDA Data Collection
For the collection of RDA samples utilized for illustration purposes in this paper, we
undertook a simple keyword-based web search limited to articles in the period between
2018 and 2020. The main queries (with associated boolean operators) that we considered
were: “artificial intelligence”,“AI”, “autonomous”, “neural network”, “deepfakes”, “AI”
AND “bias”, “AI” AND “failure”, “AI” AND “security”, “AI” AND “safety”, “AI” AND
“attack”. While many terms are tailored to the type of keys represented in the taxonomy (Ia,
Ib, Ic, Id) that served as basis for categorization in the RDA as introduced in Section 2, we
also considered utmost general queries such as “artificial intelligence” in order to do justice
to the eventuality that we might identify a novel entirely unexpected categorization pattern.
With other words, we also foresaw the possibility of not yet encountered anomalies while
analyzing the results. As briefly mentioned in Section 4.2, such a case would have been
assigned to a generic placeholder key for novel unknown patterns. It would have called for
further scrutiny and eventually for a future enlargement of the taxonomy. However, as
mentioned in Section 4.2, we did not yet identify any novelty of this kind in the discussed
RDA. Though, at a lower level, we discovered atypical instances of the pre-existing key-
determined clusters. We tagged this atypicality by refering to corresponding clusters with
the attribute “extra”—which was the case for the extra cluster of automated disconcertion
linked to risk Ia and the extra cluster of automated peer pressure connected to risk Ic.
Self-evidently, the underlying search can be performed in a more sophisticated way
in future AI observatory projects. First, a broader range of keys and combinations can be
strategically devised in the light of RDA and RCRA results from a previous AI observatory
iteration. Second, the efforts can be supported by web crawlers [217]. Third, this could be
combined with sentiment analysis tools [218] to detect negatively polarized texts of interest
for an RDA. Fourth, the creation of novel datasets for text classification [219] could be
undertaken for the pre-existing keys of the taxonomy which might however remain insuffi-
cient with regard to placeholders for novel patterns. In this vein, we stress the importance
of human analysts for a deep semantic understanding requiring explanatory knowledge
especially when it comes to the discovery of subtle novel tendencies within superficially
similar text sources. Morever, an intense examination of textual material can lead to a
further disentanglement of pre-existing clusters—which could even reveal the need for
a broader change of the taxonomic keys. In short, a safety-aware responsible RDA data
collection pipeline is not entirely automatable and requires human-level understanding
by analysts.
6.2. Interlinking RDA-Based RCRA Pre-Processing and RCRA DFs
As elucidated in Section 4.2, the preparatory procedure generating candidate RCRA
clusters based on RDA instances consisted of 4 consecutive steps: (1) taxonomization,
(2) analytical clustering, (3) brute-force deliberation and threshold-based pruning and finally
(4) assembly. Subsequently, these RCRA clusters served as basis to generate RCRA DFs
that we exemplified with short RCRA narratives instantiating these clusters as presented
in Section 4.3. However, for the sake of simplicity, the exact methodological approach
to interlink the preparatory procedure and the RCRA co-creation DF was not previously
characterized. In a nutshell, we utilized a method we call complementary cognitive co-
creation (CCC). While other methods are thinkable, we encourage considering CCC where
possible for reasons described in the next paragraphs. Beforehand, we must specify that
purposefully, the set of researchers involved in the preparatory procedure of the RCRA and
the set of researchers performing the ensuing RCRA DFs were disjunct. For clarity, we refer
to the former as preparatory group and to the latter as executive group. We explain how a
complementary collaborative effort between these groups in the form of CCC can increase
the variety and illustrative power of RCRA DFs.
After applying taxonomization and analytical clustering to the RDA instances, the
preparatory group has been described in Section 4.2 to perform brute-force deliberation
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and threshold-based pruning. While a brute-force search could appear suboptimal at first
sight, we specifically considered this option in order to allow for the preparatory group
to potentially be able to retrospectively diversify the generation of instances performed
by the executive group given the RCRA clusters. This becomes possible, because whilst
the preparatory group goes through every single available RDA instance, it attempts to
generate an above threshold downward counterfactual that if identified can later turn out
to be utile to store. In short, when a downward counterfactual is successfully generated for
a given RDA sample, the preparatory group can not only maintain the RDA sample, but
also store the generated downward counterfactual instance for later RCRA augmentation
purposes. Thereby, as briefly specified, generic RCRA clusters were used instead of specific
instances as inputs for the RCRA DFs to avoid overfitting to the idosyncrasies of unique
events and possibly generate a broader variety of DF scenarios. In fact, by solely providing
RCRA clusters to the executive group at the start of the DFs, we avoid a potentially biased
negative influence by the narrow instances of the preparatory group that fulfilled a different
primary function (namely the identification of above threshold patterns). To recapitulate,
the preparatory procedure can be more precisely re-explained as follows: the preparatory
group undergoes all 4 consecutive steps with the crucial additional detail that the brute-
force deliberation and threshold-based pruning operation also includes the storing of a
successfully generated downward counterfactual instance for each maintained factual RDA
instance. After this pre-DF processing, the preparatory group delivers the RCRA clusters to
the executive group which then engages in generating a variety of narratives instances for
each obtained cluster. Post-DF, the executive group compares the generated instances with
those imagined by the preparatory group pre-DF. All cases that were not yet considered by
the executive group18 but were generated by the preparatory group, are concatenated to
the now augmented DFs. Duplicates are ignored.
This overall sequence of steps presents a theoretical collaborative basis for an augmen-
tation of co-creation DFs to which we refer to with CCC. A further tool that may improve the
efficacy of CCC is to add a functional viewpoint (i.e., related to information processing in a
certain context). On closer inspection, it becomes clear why CCC can profit from a func-
tional or/and (neuro-)cognitive [220–222] diversity of the partaking researchers. Given that
in the human cognitive domain, variety is the norm [223] and heterogeneity can provide
requisite variety in complex multi-causal dynamic problem domains [214] necessitating
collective learning [220] and innovation [224], it makes sense to explore this potential. For
instance, while the preparatory group can especially profit from individuals that excel at
convergent thinking, the executive group may benefit from divergent thinkers. Pre-DF, the
preparatory group needs to map from one factual instance to one counterfactual instance.
In the DF, the executive group maps from one counterfactual cluster to many counterfac-
tual instances. The former requires a horizontal integration at a low level of abstraction
while the latter requires a vertical integration from a higher to a lower level of abstraction
revealing the potential for complementary synergies19. A CCC-based approach combining a
preparatory group comprising i.a. individuals with a cognitive profile exhibiting strengths
in the former and an executive group i.a. sampled from a pool of individuals with strengths
in the latter could increase efficiency, variety and illustrative power of RDA-based RCRA
co-creation DFs—critical to raise safety-awareness in experts but also in the public.
18 Note that if given an RCRA cluster, the executive group would not succeed in imagining a corresponding instance for a narrative, there is always at
least one back-up instantiation—which corresponds to the narrative envisaged by the participatory group pre-DF (whose identification represented
the precondition for this cluster to exist in the first place).
19 For instance, despite possible significant context-dependent [223] hindrances, dyadic mismatches [225] and disabilities, autistic traits are also
paired with enhanced convergent thinking [226], detail-rich thinking [227] and higher verbal creativity [228] while attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder traits have been linked to enhanced divergent thinking [229,230] and enhanced originality and flexibility [231]. Systematically combining
these two complementary cognitive profiles under a CCC-oriented approach to RDA-based RCRA-DFs for AI observatory feedback-loops could
engender benefits.
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7. Conclusions
Starting with a cybersecurity-oriented fit-for-purpose taxonomy of ethical distinction,
we introduced and exemplified a retrospective descriptive analysis (RDA) for future AI obser-
vatory projects. Subsequently, we elucidated how to craft a complementary retrospective
counterfactual risk analysis (RCRA) based on downward counterfactuals from the previ-
ously extracted factual RDA samples. Motivated by recent work on risk management
of hazardous events [14] and the functional theory of counterfactual thinking [15] from so-
cial psychology, we elaborated on why an RDA-based RCRA may be suitable for risk
analyses in a complex multi-causal domain such as AI safety. Thereafter, in the light of
the ethical sensitivity of AI risk instantiations, we discussed the use of harm intensity
ratings for samples of an AI observatory given the perceiver-dependent, harm-based and
dyadic nature of human cognitive templates in morality [25]. For illustrative purposes,
we suggested a threshold-based approach focusing the RDA-based RCRA on downward
counterfactuals of at least lethal dimensions. On the one hand, such a high threshold may
engender fewer discrepancies in the moral perception being related to harm. On the other
hand, it may simultaneously represent a suitable threshold reinforcing mortality salience (i.e.,
the awareness of one’s mortality). From the perspective of a relevant socio-psychological
theory denoted terror management theory [232,233], mortality salience—whose elicita-
tion is also conceivable in co-creation design fictions from HCI including virtual reality
settings [234]—may be able to foster safety-awareness and cautionary attitudes [234,235].
Against the backdrop of the RDA samples collected and our targeted RDA-based RCRA,
we formulated the need for inherently transdisciplinary and hybrid cognitive-affective AI
observatory and AI safety strategies. As guidelines for future work, we compiled a rich
variety of tailored multi-level near-term solutions.
Finally, we provided a differentiated general outlook on long-term AI safety direc-
tions by axiomatically contrasting two disparate recent AI safety paradigms along rele-
vant contradistinctive leitmotifs. More precisely, we contrasted the artifical stupidity (AS)
paradigm with the eternal creativity (EC) paradigm. While AS and EC share a common
cybersecurity-oriented and hybrid cognitive-affective stance with regard to multiple near-
term AI safety solutions, they differ fundamentally in many future avenues of research.
AS offers intelligence-focused, restriction-based and tailored substrate-dependent long-term
guidelines. By contrast, long-term EC guidelines bring into focus conscious explanatory
knowledge creation and understanding and recommend unbounded functional augmentation of
substrate-independent nature. While AS suggests utilizing human cognitive performance
as upper bound for AI capabilities to limit hardware and software parameters, EC takes a
cybernetic perspective according to which humans need to jointly augment both human
and AI functions—for example, via a doubly ambiguous artificial creativity augmenta-
tion research.
In a nutshell, we collated retrospective analyses complemented by future-oriented
contradistinctions in order to: (1) apprise future AI observatory projects using concrete ex-
amples from practice and technically plausible above threshold downward counterfactuals,
(2) thematizing possibly decisive bifurcations in future AI (safety) research and (3) pointing
out the requirement of a constructive collaborative dialectical approach addressing those.
As stated by Popper, “while differing widely in the various little bits we know, in our infinite
ignorance we are all equal” [167]. Time might tell whether the assumption that “the price
of security is artificial stupidity” or rather that “the price of security is eternal creativity” [13]
(or none of those) turns out to practically solve long-term AI safety problems. Either
way, explanatory knowledge co-creation can heavily influence whether we will succeed in
understanding how to transform today’s vulnerability awareness and mortality salience into
the currently known or unknowable upward counterfactuals of our counterfactual future.
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